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Union Effects on Productivity, 
Profits, and Growth: Has the 
Long Run Arrived? 
John T. Addison, University of South Carolina and 
Universitit Bamberg 
Barry T. Hirsch, University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
This article interprets literature xamining union effects on economic 
performance. Production function studies indicate small overall union 
impacts on productivity; positive effects, where they exist, appear to 
result from management response to decreased profit expectations 
and from a natural selection process. Lower profitability among 
unionized firms is well established; more interesting isthe possibility 
that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long-lived tangible 
and intangible capital. The connection between unions, investment 
behavior, and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful 
line of empirical inquiry, although it does not encourage a sanguine 
view of unionism's long-run impact. 
I. Introduction 
Controversy continues to surround the nature and direction of union 
effects on economic performance. Much of the impetus behind this debate 
stems from the work of Richard Freeman and James Medoff (1984), who 
point to potential increases in productivity resulting from union-induced 
changes in the workplace. Such increases are effected through the exercise 
We have benefited from the comments of seminar participants and readers of 
earlier versions of the paper. 
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of "collective voice," coupled with an appropriate institutional response 
from management. Unions, it is argued, lower turnover and establish more 
efficient governance structures in workplaces characterized by public goods, 
complementarities inproduction, and long-term contractual relations. Al- 
though recent literature continues as before to investigate productivity 
differentials, increasing attention is being given to an examination of union 
effects on profitability, investment, and growth. 
This article interprets recent literature xamining union effects on eco- 
nomic performance. We first address the ambiguity surrounding the pro- 
duction function test itself, prior to offering an interpretation of observed 
productivity differences. The newer literature xamining union effects on 
profitability is next analyzed. Issues yet to be resolved in this area include 
the magnitude of the union profit effect, the consistency of union pro- 
ductivity and profitability estimates, and the sources from which unions 
capture profits. Finally, we turn to what may be the most interesting aspect 
of the literature; namely, the dynamic effect of unions on productivity 
growth, investment activity, and long-run performance. It is concluded 
that the debate over what unions do will focus increasingly on the longer- 
term consequences of union rent seeking. 
II. Productivity and the Production Function Test 
Measurement Issues 
The majority of the union productivity studies follow Brown and Medoff 
(1978) in employing some variant of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
Q = AK'(L, + cL )l-a, (1) 
where Q is output, K is capital, Lam and L, are union and nonunion labor, 
respectively, A is a constant of proportionality, and a and (1 - a) are the 
output elasticities with respect o capital and labor. The parameter c reflects 
productivity differences between union and nonunion labor. If c > 1, then 
union labor is more productive, in line with the collective voice model; if 
c < 1, then union labor is less productive, in line with conventional ar- 
guments concerning the deleterious impact of such things as union work 
rules and constraints on merit-based wage dispersion. Manipulation of 
equation (1) yields the estimating equation (we ignore the error term) 
In (QIL) - In A + a In (KIL) + (1 -a) (c -1)P, (2) 
where P is union density (L,/L). 
Equation (2) assumes constant returns to scale. This assumption may 
be relaxed by including a In L variable as a measure of establishment size. 
The coefficient on P measures the logarithmic productivity differential 
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of unionized establishments; if it is assumed that the union productivity 
effect solely reflects the differential efficiency of labor inputs, the union 
labor productivity effect is calculated by dividing the coefficient on P 
by (1 - a). Also, to anticipate what follows, c > 1 implies that unions 
have higher total factor productivity (TFP), as obtains after subtracting 
a ln(K/L) from both sides of (2), 
In Q -a In K -(1 -a)ln L = TFP - In A + (1 -a)(c -1)P. (3) 
A number of limitations attach to the production function test. As Brown 
and Medoff themselves noted, the use of value added as an output measure 
confounds price and quantity effects. That is, part of the measured union 
productivity differential may result from higher prices in the unionized 
sector. Not surprisingly, estimated union productivity effects tend to be 
lower when price adjustments are made (e.g., Allen 1984b) and are rarely 
large in studies where Q is measured explicitly in physical units. Union 
firms can more easily pass through igher costs in product markets heltered 
from nonunion and foreign competition. Use of value added, therefore, is
most likely to confound price and output effects in aggregate analyses 
relating industry value added to industry union density. It is less likely to 
be a problem in firm-level analyses that at least allow the possibility of 
controlling for a firm's union status and industry density. A related pos- 
sibility is that the union coefficient in equation (2) may crudely be tracking 
the union-nonunion wage differential.' 
The most pointed criticism leveled at the Brown-Medoff approach has 
come from Morgan Reynolds, who argues: "Estimates of c are of no con- 
sequence in discovering the independent impact of unionization on pro- 
ductivity because there is no way to statistically separate observed marginal 
productivity differentials from union/nonunion price [wage] differentials" 
(Reynolds 1986, pp. 445-46). He points out that if profit-maximizing 
firms operate on the labor demand curve, they will adjust employment 
such that the marginal value product, OY/OL, equals the wage. If union 
establishments face a higher wage, they will lower employment so that 
they have a correspondingly higher marginal value product. According to 
Reynolds (1986, p. 445), we thus will observe 
w,/Wn = (OY/OLa)/(OY/OLn) = c, (4) 
This argument was suggested to us by Gregg Lewis in correspondence. It relies 
on the argument that, by definition, value added is the sum of union and nonunion 
labor cost and a residual that chiefly comprises the return to owned capital. Fol- 
lowing Lewis, a Taylor expansion of such an equation yields a ln(Q/L) function 
in which union density (P) enters in conjunction with labor's hare times the union 
wage premium. The suggestion is that the coefficient onP from eq. (2) varies 
directly with the union-nonunion wage differential. 
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where subscripts u and n denote union and nonunion, respectively. Re- 
gardless of whether or not capital and labor quality are controlled for 
statistically, union firms facing higher wage rates must have a correspond- 
ingly higher marginal value product in long-run equilibrium. The pro- 
duction function test, according to Reynolds, proves only that union wages 
are higher, not that unions increase productivity. 
How valid is Reynolds's criticism? He is correct in stating that firms 
operating on their labor demand curves will adjust employment such that 
OY/OL = w. Reynolds's case, then, rests on the question of what in fact 
is measured econometrically inthe production function studies and whether 
union wage-employment settlements are located on labor demand curves. 
Because the production function studies control for capital inputs and 
labor quality, it can be argued that they measure vertical shifts of the labor 
demand schedule resulting from union productivity effects, namely, a 
comparison of union and nonunion (OY/OL)I K. By contrast, movements 
along a nonshifted emand schedule imply a changing ratio of labor to 
other inputs. The production function approach, then, need not be an 
inappropriate test of the union productivity effect if other inputs in the 
production process can be measured accurately. (Other problems may of 
course make the approach inappropriate.) But, as Brown and Medoff, as 
well as Reynolds, point out, union firms facing higher wage rates must be 
more productive if they are to survive in the long run. Hence the union 
productivity effect is not being measured across a representative sample 
of firms. Rather, only those union firms that have survived by increasing 
productivity (a shift in the demand schedule) sufficiently to offset higher 
union wages are observed. Measurement of union productivity differentials 
from among a sample of surviving firms thus overstates the productivity 
effect of unions on a representative firm. It does measure a productivity 
rather than a wage effect, however, although in the long run these two 
effects hould tend to converge. 
The Reynolds criticism must be further qualified if wage-employment 
outcomes are not located on the labor demand schedule. As is well known, 
settlements on the demand curve are generally inefficient (McDonald and 
Solow 1981). There exist settlements off the labor demand curve, at lower 
wage and higher employment levels than would obtain through sequential 
wage and employment determination, preferred by both the union and 
management. A settlement on the contract curve (formed by the tangencies 
of the union indifference and firm isoprofit curves) requires explicit or 
implicit contracting that jointly determines wages and employment; oth- 
erwise, once a wage was determined, the firm could maximize short-run 
profitability by adjusting employment o the corresponding point on the 
demand schedule. No static inefficiency would result in the event of set- 
tlements on a vertical contract curve, referred to as the "strong efficiency" 
case (Brown and Ashenfelter 1986). Both parties agree to maximize the 
76 Addison/Hirsch 
joint value of the enterprise to owners and labor and then bargain over its 
division. Despite skepticism as to the actual union political model and 
contractual mechanisms that would produce settlements off the demand 
schedule (Oswald 1984), empirical studies generally reject the hypothesis 
of wage-employment outcomes on the demand schedule and find mixed 
support for the hypothesis of strongly efficient settlements (Brown and 
Ashenfelter 1986; Card 1986; Eberts and Stone 1986; MaCurdy and Pencavel 
1986; Svejnar 1986; and Abowd 1987). 
If contract settlements off the labor demand schedule obtain, the link 
between union-nonunion relative wages and marginal products is severed. 
We do know, however, that the marginal value product of union labor 
(measured on the demand schedule) will be less than the union wage, 
whereas the two will be equated in nonunion firms (ignoring the possibility 
of sufficiently large threat effects whereby nonunion outcomes mimic union 
outcomes). The equality stated by Reynolds in equation (7) need no longer 
hold; the union-nonunion productivity differential will be less than the 
union relative wage effect. The appropriateness of the production function 
test, therefore, continues to rest largely on econometric issues. 
Also troubling is the assumption made in most studies of identical pro- 
duction functions in the union and nonunion sectors (i.e., a,, = ao). Such 
an assumption is necessitated in aggregate studies by the absence of separate 
data on the union and nonunion sectors, although union density can be 
interacted with other right-hand side variables in aggregate models. Brown 
and Medoff (1978) investigate the consequences of relaxing this assumption 
and find the estimated union coefficient sensitive to assumed differences 
in au and ac, being sharply lower in most cases. The assumption of equiv- 
alent production parameters is probably less serious-and less necessary- 
in industry-specific studies (see Clark 1980a, 1980b). In addition, estimation 
of the production function in log-linear form, made possible by use of a 
first-order Taylor-series approximation, biases upward the absolute value 
of the estimated union productivity effect (Lovell, Sickles, and Warren 
1988). The implication is that existing Cobb-Douglas studies have over- 
stated (by an apparently modest degree) both positive and negative esti- 
mates of union productivity effects. 
The production function test also may depend crucially on the ability 
to control accurately for all inputs in the production process. Union and 
nonunion establishments may differ systematically in the quality of un- 
measured organizational factors o that "firm effects" are not independent 
of union status. For example, inputs such as managerial supervision and 
the quality of labor relations may be correlated with unionism, and omission 
of these factors may bias the union coefficient. That being said, neither 
Brown and Medoff nor Clark find their estimates to be sensitive to the 
exclusion of labor quality controls. 
One response to the broader problem of a restrictive functional form 
has been to assume a translog rather than a Cobb-Douglas technology 
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(Boal 1985; Bemmels 1987). The translog form allows one to test for 
restrictions on technology made by Cobb-Douglas-for example, unitary 
elasticity of substitution between inputs and homogeneity. Translog studies 
have decisively rejected the Cobb-Douglas specification. Yet as Allen (1987) 
points out, estimation of any production function by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is strictly appropriate only when input quantities are exogenous 
(see Nerlove [1965], pp. 29-34, for a more general analysis of this point). 
This is clearly not the case in the production function test, posing a si- 
multaneity problem for all such studies. One response to the problem has 
been to measure the relative efficiency of union and nonunion establish- 
ments using (translog) cost and profit functions (e.g., Allen 1987), in 
which the union effect is captured via intercept and slope parameters that 
vary by union status. Both functions have the advantage of permitting a 
direct estimate of the net effect of unions on profits or costs, in contrast 
to the alternative practice of comparing union coefficients from separate 
production and wage equations.2 
Evidence and Interpretation 
In light of the concerns regarding the production function test, critical 
evaluation of the empirical evidence is required. We make no attempt o 
provide a complete review of what is now a large literature (for surveys, 
see Freeman and Medoff [1984]; Hirsch and Addison [1986]); rather, we 
examine closely what we believe are the most important studies and patterns 
evident in this literature. The original Brown and Medoff (1978) paper 
will be our benchmark. Using aggregate two-digit manufacturing industry 
data cross-classified by state groups for 1972, Brown and Medoff obtain 
coefficients on union density of from .22 to .24, implying values of c - 1 
(obtained by dividing the union coefficient by 1 - a) of from .30 to .31. 
In a separate analysis using the 1973-75 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
files, they estimate a logarithmic union-nonunion wage differential of .23 
(averaged over males and females). 
Most of the potential measurement problems previously discussed apply 
with some force to the Brown-Medoff study. While these problems are 
largely unavoidable and recognized by the authors, any generalization of 
their results must meet the dual criteria of plausibility and consistency 
2 An alternative approach to measuring productivity differences is the estimation 
of nonstochastic, nonparametric frontier production functions (Forsund, Lovell, 
and Schmidt 1980). These estimation procedures allow production efficiency to
be decomposed into allocative (price) and technical efficiency, the latter being 
further decomposed into a Farrell measure of efficiency (a firm is technically in- 
efficient if it operates on the interior of its production set), a measure of input 
"congestion," and a measure of scale efficiency. In principle, such estimation results 
would facilitate inferences as to how unions affect productivity. This approach may 
prove promising for industry-specific union productivity studies. 
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with subsequent findings. By either standard, their estimate of the union 
productivity effect is too high. Labor's share in value added is .53 (Brown 
and Medoff 1978, p. 367), implying an increase in unit cost of 12% (.23 
times .53) stemming from the union wage premium. A .22 to .24 increase 
in total factor productivity, however, in turn would decrease unit costs by 
over 20%. Hence, the net effect of union wage and productivity effects 
would be to decrease unit costs substantially. Although union effects on 
the profit rate cannot be ascertained with precision from the change in 
unit costs (Clark 1984), these parameter estimates would almost certainly 
imply an increase in profitability resulting from unionism. But the profits 
literature provides unambiguous evidence of lower profitability inunionized 
industries and firms. 
Wessels (1985) casts further doubt on the plausibility of large union 
productivity estimates because of inconsistencies between this result and 
employment effects. Specifically, he argues that if wage setting is con- 
strained by the demand function and labor is measured in efficiency units 
in the production function, it is impossible to reconcile equal wage and 
productivity increases with conventional (below unity) estimates of the 
elasticity of labor demand. The possible exception is where unions exclu- 
sively enhance capital productivity, but even here it is shown that the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor would have to fall con- 
siderably below unity to produce the result that unions raise productivity 
substantially. Again, conventional estimates of the substitution elasticity 
are too high to reconcile apparently small union employment effects with 
the measured impact of unions on productivity. Wessels concludes that 
one of the effects must be wrong: either unions do not substantially increase 
productivity or they substantially reduce employment.3 
There are surprisingly few manufacturing- and economy-wide produc- 
tivity studies and, except for Brown and Medoff, none reports evidence of 
a positive overall union productivity effect. In perhaps the best study to 
date, Clark (1984) uses the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) data 
for 902 manufacturing businesses from 1970-80 (over 4,600 usable obser- 
vations) to estimate value-added (and scales) equations similar to (2). He 
obtains marginally significant coefficients on the union variable from -.02 
to. -.03, in sharp contrast o the results in Brown and Medoff. The Clark 
study has the advantage of a large sample size over multiple years, business- 
specific information on union coverage, and a detailed set of control vari- 
ables (although the union coefficient is little affected by the inclusion of 
3 Although is basic point is sound, limitations attach to Wessels's analysis. He 
does not address the possibility of efficient bargaining outcomes off the demand 
curve, he appears to say (Wessels 1985, p. 103) that unit costs do not change if 
productivity and wages increase by equal percentages (this ignores the fact that 
labor's share is less than one), and he rather glosses over the diversity of research 
findings. 
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the latter). The study can otherwise be subjected to many of the same 
criticisms that apply to the Brown-Medoff analysis. In Clark's separate 
two-digit industry regressions, positive union productivity effects are found 
only for textiles, furniture, and petroleum (estimates range from 6% 
to 17%). 
Studies by Bemmels (1987), who estimates a translog production function 
using a limited sample of 46 surveyed manufacturing plants in 1982, Hirsch 
(in press), who estimates a variant of equation (2) using a sample of 315 
Fortune 1,000 companies, and Lovell, Sickles, and Warren (1988), who 
estimate an economy-wide annual time-series model of equation (2), all 
conclude that unions decrease productivity (the estimate of c in the latter 
study is implausibly low). Based on the extant evidence, we conclude that 
the average union productivity effect is probably quite small and, indeed, 
is just as likely to be negative as positive. 
As expected, results from industry- and firm-specific productivity studies 
produce a varied picture. The primary advantage of these studies is that 
many of the econometric problems inherent in the aggregate studies are 
avoided. For example, output can be measured in physical units rather 
than value added, information on firm-level union status is more readily 
available, and coefficients can be allowed to differ between the union and 
nonunion sectors. Moreover, recent studies have moved away from the 
overly restrictive Cobb-Douglas specification or have attempted to avoid 
input endogeneity problems by estimation of cost rather than production 
functions. But these advantages are achieved at the price of a loss in gen- 
erality. Taken as a group, however, we believe that within the diversity of 
these results are to be found systematic patterns that increase our under- 
standing of how unions affect he workplace. 
From a methodological perspective, two of the best analyses are Clark's 
studies of the cement industry (Clark 1980a, 1980b) and Allen's most 
recent analysis of the construction industry (Allen 1987). Clark's studies 
are notable for the use of physical output measures, for allowing production 
function parameters to vary between union and nonunion plants, in con- 
trolling for firm effects through the study of plants changing from nonunion 
to union status, and in introducing a supervisory labor input measure. In 
his wider study, Clark (1980b) investigates productivity differences between 
nine nonunion (29 observations) and 119 union (436 observations) cement 
plants over the period 1973-76. He finds marginally significant (using one- 
tailed tests) union coefficients in the range .07-.10. An interesting result 
is that union proproductivity effects are most pronounced in the Southwest 
region of his sample, where nonunion firms are most prevalent, although, 
as before, the union coefficients are estimated with considerable impreci- 
sion. In a novel study of six cement plants that changed from nonunion 
to union status between 1953 and 1976, Clark (1980a) reports a positive 
union productivity differential of from 6% to 8%. Although significance 
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levels are again weak, evidence from his fixed effects model indicates a
small positive productivity effect that is apparently sustained through time. 
In perhaps the most ambitious study to date, Allen (1987) attempts to 
measure the relative efficiency of union and nonunion establishments using 
cost and profit functions. Translog cost function are estimated for three 
separate samples of building construction projects (commercial office 
buildings, chools, and hospitals). As noted earlier, this approach allows 
for the endogeneity of input quantities and also sidesteps problems at- 
taching to the comparison between union productivity and wage effect 
estimates from separate production and earnings functions containing dif- 
ferent control variables or estimated atdifferent levels of aggregation. Allen 
finds higher costs for union contractors in school and hospital construction, 
but lower costs in commercial office buildings, ceteris paribus. The hy- 
pothesis of equal cost function parameters i soundly rejected across all 
specifications in the schools sample; however, differences between coef- 
ficients are less evident in the commercial office buildings sample (while 
the number of nonunion hospitals is too limited to allow -such tests in the 
hospital sample). 
A striking result from this tudy is the finding of greater scale economies 
in the union sector; diseconomies appear in the nonunion sector at lower 
output levels and increase more rapidly with output. Union office building 
construction costs less once buildings exceed athreshold size and, thereafter, 
becomes teadily less expensive with output. For schools, on the other 
hand, even though marginal costs fall with output in the union sample 
(and rise in the nonunion sample), nonunion contractors are more cost 
efficient a all output levels. Taken in conjunction with his profits results, 
these findings support a competitive union explanation for office buildings 
and a monopoly union explanation for schools and hospitals ( ee, relatedly, 
Allen 1986a). Office buildings are built for the private sector while schools 
and some hospitals are built for the public sector. Allen argues that market 
segmentation characterizes public sector contracts, allowing union con- 
struction to have higher costs without sacrifice in profits. In commercial 
office buildings, by contrast, he absence of market segmentation and greater 
cost consciousness require competitive unionism. Scale economies in 
unionized construction are attributed tothe effectiveness of union hiring 
halls in guaranteeing large supplies of (already screened) skilled labor and, 
in part, to the irrelevance of certain restrictive practices (e.g., minimum 
crew sizes) on large projects. He is unable to quantify these ffects, although 
it does appear that his results reflect more than just compositional effects 
(see Allen [1986b] for further discussion of scale economies). 
We have dwelled at some length on the Allen study because not only 
does it provide a glimpse inside the union productivity black box, but also 
demonstrates palpably that the union impact is not a datum, hints at the 
potentially important role of market structure, and addresses a number of 
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deficiencies in the literature. We note that the rationale for positive union 
productivity effects is not rooted in collective voice considerations because 
of the short-term employment relation that obtains in construction. 
Despite substantial diversity in the industry-specific studies, several sys- 
tematic patterns are revealed. As previously noted in Hirsch and Addison 
(1986, chap. 7), estimated productivity effects tend to be largest in those 
industries where union-nonunion wage differentials are most pronounced. 
Of course, such a pattern is exactly what would be predicted by critics of 
the production function test. We contend that these results also support a 
traditional "shock effect" interpretation of unionization. In industries or 
firms where unions obtain large wage premiums, management must re- 
spond to the increase in labor costs by organizing more efficiently, reducing 
slack, and increasing measured productivity.4 
Second, positive union productivity effects are largely restricted to the 
private sector and appear to be most significant where competitive pressures 
are intense. This latter point was taken up by Clark (1980b), who found 
the largest union productivity effect in the region where nonunion com- 
petition was most pronounced. Similarly, in an early and widely cited 
study of residential construction in two cities, Mandelstamm (1965) iden- 
tified competition from outside contractors in a nearby metropolitan area 
as the chief source of the greater efficiency observed in his more highly 
unionized city. And in Clark's (1984) analysis of lines of business, the 
largest positive union-nonunion productivity differentials were found in 
industries having relatively large nonunion sectors (textiles, furniture, and 
petroleum). The apparent absence of a sizable productivity effect in public 
libraries (Ehrenberg, Sherman, and Schwarz 1983), government bureaus 
(Noam 1983), schools (Eberts and Stone 1987), and hospitals (Sloan and 
Adamache 1984), despite significant union wage premiums in all but the 
library sample, supports the thesis that product market competition is a 
spur to greater efficiency in unionized markets (this theme is examined 
directly by Allen [1987, 1986a]). 
Perhaps the most direct evidence of a shock effect is reported by Clark 
(1980a), who finds that management adjustments to unionism exhibit fairly 
consistent patterns in the wake of unionization. In all cases new plant 
managers were hired, and in most cases there was increased emphasis on 
cutting costs, establishing production targets and goals, and improving 
monitoring and communications. Yet a problem of interpretation remains. 
4Causation could be argued to work in the opposite direction, with union- 
induced productivity increases leading to large union wage premiums. This appears 
unlikely. If unionism raised productivity directly, there would be mutual gains 
from unionization, with labor and shareholders haring in the gains. Thus we 
would observe management in nonunion firms encouraging union organizing and 
higher profits in union firms. Neither outcome is observed. Moreover, firm-specific 
productivity changes should not affect competitive, market-clearing wages. 
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The evidence indicates that a relatively competitive, cost-conscious eco- 
nomic environment is a necessary condition for a managerial response to 
unions that will produce a positive productivity gain. Such a response 
should also be larger, ceteris paribus, the larger the union wage gain (or, 
alternatively, the greater the pressure on profits). It is precisely in such 
competitive nvironments, however, that there should be relatively little 
managerial slack and the least scope for union organizing and wage gains. 
This reinforces our earlier conclusion that the possibility for sizable union 
productivity effects i limited. Clearly, any judgment aken on the potential 
scope for union productivity enhancement hinges crucially on one's priors 
regarding the degree of competitiveness and slack in the economy.5 
For this reason, a complementary and perhaps more appealing expla- 
nation of the empirical regularities in the literature would be that the 
productivity studies suffer from a selectivity or survival bias. As discussed 
in the previous section, union firms unable to increase productivity in 
response to union wage increases are less likely to survive and be included 
in researchers' data samples. Thus, estimates of union effects on productivity 
(or profits and costs) are biased estimates of the union effect on a repre- 
sentative sample of nonunion firms. Not all firms are "shocked" or able 
to respond sufficiently tooffset union cost increases. In the long run these 
firms will not survive. 
Direct evidence on the routes through which unions affect he workplace 
remains meager. As Brown and Medoff (1978, p. 374) state: "The idea that 
unions make firms . . . more productive would be more persuasive if the 
mechanisms by which productivity is improved could be isolated." A cen- 
tral tenet of the collective-voice framework motivating these analyses is 
that the substitution of voice for exit will reduce quits and improve morale 
and cooperation among workers. Related arguments suggest hat improved 
governance structures can lead to union productivity gains. Yet the evidence 
is opaque. While cross-section and time-series evidence reveals that quits 
are significantly lower among union workers, ceteris paribus (Freeman 
1980; Blau and Kahn 1983; and Mincer 1983), there is little to suggest that 
this advantage significantly contributes to productivity.6 Clark (1980a) re- 
ports either no change or even higher quits following unionization in three 
of the six plants he followed over time. One route through which union 
voice might improve productivity is via the establishment of procedures 
S Unions initially may organize and gain bargaining power during a period where 
a firm or industry has significant market power. Union impact on profitability is
likely to intensify over time as foreign and domestic nonunion competition increase 
and union wage increases cannot be passed through to consumers. 
6 Brown and Medoff introduce a quits variable into their production function 
and attribute the reduction in the union coefficient to the effects of lower quits on 
productivity. This procedure reduces the union coefficient by one-fifth; the residual 
four-fifths are loosely attributed to "better management, morale, motivation, com- 
munication, etc." (Brown and Medoff 1978, p. 74). 
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to handle grievances, but there is no direct evidence to support this view. 
Ichniowski (1986), using data from 10 unionized paper mills, finds the 
number of grievances filed to be inversely related to productivity (see also 
Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 1983); left unanswered in this treatment, how- 
ever, is the effectiveness of union voice in reducing and/or arbitrating 
grievances relative to implicit grievance procedures occurring in similar 
unobserved nonunion plants. 
In sum, we should expect to find rather more positive and direct indi- 
cations of the operation of collective voice. Further ambiguity is occasioned 
by Allen's (1984a) finding that absenteeism is at least 30% higher among 
union workers (even though he reports that the decline in productivity 
from this source is only a fraction of 1 percent). The greater dissatisfaction 
apparently expressed by union workers need not be inconsistent with 
union-induced improvements in efficiency via collective voice (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984, chap. 9; Leigh 1986). But neither is it inconsistent with 
a shock effect explanation whereby the work pace is increased in unionized 
settings, leading to greater worker dissatisfaction. 
Finally, there remains the unresolved problem of union endogeneity. 
We know that union workplaces differ substantially from nonunion work- 
places (Duncan and Stafford 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984). Can unions 
more successfully organize where there exist special cost advantages? Or, 
as suggested by Brown and Medoff (1978, p. 368), are unions more heavily 
organized in less productive (two-digit) industries? Do U.S. companies' 
newer and largely nonunion plants have higher productivity than their 
older and more highly organized plants? We know of no study that has 
satisfactorily addressed the issue of union endogeneity in estimating union- 
nonunion productivity differentials. 
We conclude that there is no compelling evidence that, in general, the 
net effect of unions on productivity is positive or negative. Rather by 
default, the explanation for positive union productivity effects, where they 
are observed, is best explained by either shock effect arguments or by 
deficiencies in the production function test. Actual union productivity gains 
appear to be generated by management responses to sizable wage premiums, 
significant nonunion competition, and deteriorating profit expectations. 
Estimated union-nonunion productivity differentials may result from an 
entangling of union productivity, price, and wage effects. Or we may be 
observing the outcome of a competitive process in which less productive 
unionized enterprises have been selected out of the system. Accordingly, 
our analysis of union effects must examine dynamic aspects of economic 
performance. 
III. Unions and Profitability 
Closely related to the interpretation of the productivity evidence is the 
issue of how labor unions affect profitability. One of the more troubling 
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puzzles in the literature has been the seeming inconsistency between the 
empirical suggestion of a substantial union productivity effect and mounting 
evidence that unionism significantly reduces profitability. Information on 
union wage and productivity effects, coupled with knowledge of labor's 
share, makes possible a calculation of union effects on unit costs. For ex- 
ample, a productivity effect of 9% would leave a firm's unit costs unchanged 
if labor's share were .60 and the union wage premium 15% (it is assumed 
that the firm is fully unionized or, alternatively, that nonunion employees 
also receive a 15% premium). The link between unit costs and profit rates, 
however, is not transparent. In general, it depends on the nature of the 
bargaining settlement (e.g., on the demand curve or strong efficiency), the 
product demand elasticity, market structure, and the elasticity of substi- 
tution between capital and labor (Clark 1984). 
Perhaps the simplest case is that of sequential wage and employment 
determination on the labor demand curve, with offsetting productivity and 
wage effects that leave unit costs unchanged. For a product market mo- 
nopolist, Clark (1984, pp. 896-97) shows that the rate of return on capital 
will decrease (increase) if the elasticity of substitution isgreater (less) than 
one, whereas the return on sales will remain unchanged (because Q and 
P do not change). 
More interesting is the strong efficiency case. For purposes of compar- 
ison, examine, initially, the case of inefficient sequential wage and em- 
ployment determination on the demand curve, in which (subject to con- 
straints) the union maximizes "rents," R, and the firm maximizes profits, 
11, given wu. That is, 
max R = (wu - wo)L (union maximand), (5) 
and 
max 11 = PQ - rK - wuL (firm maximand), (6) 
where Q is output, P product price, K capital, r the price of capital, wu is 
the realized union wage, wo is the wage in the absence of unions, and L 
is employment. A measure of the excess of the union wage bill over the 
competitive wage bill, R, has been a common maximand assumed in the 
literature (e.g., Rosen 1969). 
Such an outcome is inefficient: settlements preferred by both parties 
exist off the demand curve, at a lower wage, and a higher employment 
level. An efficient bargaining situation on a vertical contract curve implies 
that the two parties will maximize (borrowing terminology from Abowd 
[1987]) the total value of the enterprise V, being the sum of firm profits 
(11) and union rents (R), and then bargain over division of the surplus. 
Maximizing V results in the same output, price, and input usage as obtains 
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in the case where the firm maximizes 11 subject to the competitive wage 
or opportunity cost wage, wo; that is, 
max V = 11 + R = PQ - rK - waL + (we - wo)L = PQ - rK - wOL. 
(7) 
Thus, the firm adjusts employment according to the opportunity cost wage 
and not its "own" wage. Here, the union has no short-run real effects 
(unions will have long-run effects to which we turn subsequently). Since 
in this case, Q, P, K, and L are not affected by the union, we can state 
unambiguously that a union wage increase (wa > wo), with no offsetting 
productivity increase, will decrease the profit rate, whether measured by 
rates of return on sales or capital, the price-cost margin, or market-value 
measures. 
A positive union productivity effect, taken in conjunction with a union 
wage increase that leaves unit costs unchanged, will also result in a lower 
profit rate (Clark 1984). Continuing to assume that the firm acts as if it 
faces competitive factor prices, a factor-neutral union productivity effect 
would have the same effect as a decrease in marginal costs, increasing 
optimal output and lowering price. Input usage will increase or decrease 
(K/L remains constant) depending on whether the product demand elas- 
ticity rj is greater or less than unity (Clark's monopoly model implies 
1 > 1). The profit rate will decrease since P falls, unit costs remain constant, 
and the use of K varies proportionately with output. 
The point of the above discussion is that a comparison of union wage 
and productivity effects provides only an approximate stimate of the union 
effect on profit rates. By the same token, evidence on union wage and 
profit effects does not allow a precise estimate of the union productivity 
effect. Empirical evidence on union-nonunion profit rate differentials, 
however, does permit us to gauge the plausibility of productivity estimates. 
More fundamentally, profitability is important in its own right since it is 
profitability that should most affect firm survival, management behavior, 
and long-run resource allocation. 
Before turning to the empirical evidence on union profit effects, some 
preliminary comments are in order. The empirical studies are surprisingly 
recent, especially considering the long-standing attention given union wage 
effects by labor economists and the plethora of profitability studies from 
the industrial organization literature. Studies have employed as their unit 
of observation either aggregate industry, firm, or line-of-business (LB) 
data. Several profitability measures have been examined. The industry 
studies most frequently use the price-cost margin (PCM), defined as (total 
revenue - variable costs)/total revenue, typically measured by 
PCM = (value added - payroll - advertising)/shipments. (8) 
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Firm-level analyses, by contrast, are likely to use accounting measures of 
the rate of return on sales (r, = earnings/sales) or the rate of return on 
capital (rk = earnings/assets). 
Several of the firm-level analyses focus on publicly traded firms and use 
a stock market value measure of profitability, the most frequent being 
Tobin's q, defined as 
q = market value/replacement costs of assets. (9) 
Firm-level studies also have employed "events" analyses that calculate 
changes in a firm's market value attributable to not fully anticipated events 
involving unionization (e.g., representation elections or changes in contract 
provisions). A typical measure here is that of cumulative abnormal returns, 
CAR, defined as 
CAR = ract- rexp, (10) 
where ract is a firm's actual rate of return (including dividends and capital 
gains) and rexp is the firm's predicted rate of return based on a "market" 
equation (which regresses a firm's r on a broad-based market portfolio's 
r) estimated over some period well before and/or after the event. CAR 
are summed over the period for which it is believed public information 
about, or anticipation of, the event might affect the stock price. CAR 
typically are averaged over a sample of firms in order to draw inferences 
as to average union effects.7 
None of the measures used in the literature isentirely satisfactory. Price- 
cost margins (PCMs) are readily measurable with industry data and cor- 
respond most closely to the excess of price over variable (or marginal) 
cost, on which so much industrial organization theory centers. In practice, 
however, PCMs may not correspond closely to the profit measures they 
are intended to represent (Liebowitz 1982). At the firm level, accounting 
rates of return are readily available from financial reports and measure 
actual or realized, as opposed to expected, earnings at particular points in 
time. Unlike accounting measures, stock market indicators uch as q are 
forward-looking rather than historical, measure performance over time 
rather than for single periods, adjust for risk differences across firms, and 
are less likely to be influenced by endogenous accounting procedures. The 
event studies also use stock market measures and have the added advantage 
of identifying the effects of specific events on market value. Yet isolating 
the effects of unanticipated events is often elusive (Binder 1985), and it 
'For a detailed review of union events tudies, see Becker and Olson (1987). 
Here, we do not consider events analyses examining the effect of strikes on security 
prices. 
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may be difficult to generalize from "marginal" union effects (e.g., certifi- 
cation elections and concession bargaining) to average union effects on 
profitability. 
A summary of U.S. estimates of union effects on profitability is presented 
in table 1. The most striking result of the studies is the common theme of 
lower profitability inunion regimes, despite substantial differences among 
analyses in methodology, data source, unit of observation, time period, 
and measure of profitability. Moreover, the magnitude of the reduction in 
profits is large. Although observed percentage reductions are not strictly 
comparable, there are some striking similarities. Of the aggregate manu- 
facturing industry studies using Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey 
of Manufactures data, Freeman (1983) finds that moving from 0% to 100% 
union coverage lowers price-cost margins by 13%-19%. Corresponding 
estimates by Voos and Mishel (1986a) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1986, 1987) point to reductions in PCMs of 23% and 22% to 
25%, respectively. 
Among the firm-level analyses, Clark (1984) reports that union businesses 
have rates of return on capital and sales that are, respectively, 19% and 
18% lower than those of their nonunion counterparts, while Hirsch and 
Connolly (1987) estimate union effects on r, ranging from 11% to 17% 
and on Tobin's q from 13% to 20%. Hirsch (in press) reports sizable 
differences in rk and q between companies with low and high levels of 
collective bargaining coverage. Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) obtain 
highly variable results, but find on average that union wins in representation 
elections reduce market value by 3.8%, whereas union losses lower market 
value by 1.3%. Abowd (1987) calculates the cost of union contracts for a 
sample of publicly traded firms and finds that unanticipated changes in 
union wealth are offset, roughly dollar for dollar, by changes in shareholder 
wealth. An anomaly among the studies is Allen's (1987) finding that profits 
on union construction projects are at least as high as those on nonunion 
projects, despite higher union costs in two of his three sectors.8 
Some perspective on the magnitude of these estimates is in order. Typ- 
ically, the reported estimates (or partial derivatives) are evaluated on the 
basis of a change from zero to complete union coverage, when in fact most 
industries and large firms have partial coverage. On the other hand, the 
negative union coefficients may be biased upward (toward zero) in many 
of these studies for reasons having to do with simultaneity bias, measure- 
ment error, and selectivity bias. Unions are more likely to organize in 
8 Allen attributes the ability of union projects to pass through igher prices to 
the existence of geographical market segmentation whereby union and nonunion 
firms in school and hospital construction rarely compete directly against each other. 
Such segmentation is possible because of the lack of cost pressure in these sectors 
and prevailing wage legislation that typically applies here but not in his private 
office building sample. 
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industries and firms where potential profits are high, biasing toward zero 
the (negative) union coefficient in OLS profit equations. Voos and Mishel 
(1986a) find evidence of simultaneity bias, obtaining estimates of a 35% 
reduction in PCM when unionism is endogenous, as compared with 23% 
with OLS (Hirsch and Connolly [1987] provide similar qualitative evi- 
dence). Substantial measurement error in the union variable may arise 
from matching three-digit ndustry union measures to four-digit industry 
observations or to individual firms. Confidence in the union-profits results 
has been enhanced, however, by studies measuring union coverage at the 
line of business or company level (Clark 1984; Abowd 1987; Hirsch, in 
press). Finally, there is a potential selectivity problem. The data reflect he 
performance only of those establishments hat have survived unionization; 
thus, union effects on surviving firms may be a biased estimate of actual 
union effects on nonsurviving firms and potential effects on current non- 
union firms. 
Ruback and Zimmerman's (1984) events analysis, and the closely related 
study by Bronars and Deere (1987), provide perhaps the most direct mea- 
sures of the expected effect of union organizing and representation on 
market values. Inferences drawn from these studies must be qualified, 
however. The union elections (covering at least 750 workers) typically do 
not include the entire firm, the profit effects for new (marginal) unionized 
firms may not be representative of union effects in existing companies, 
and results are highly variable across firms (Ruback and Zimmerman find 
that equity values increased in 35% of the firms where unions won rep- 
resentation). 
Although the magnitude of the profit reduction due to unionization 
cannot be identified precisely, it does appear to be substantial. This in turn 
raises the difficult issue of the means through which such significant profit 
reductions are effected. To address this issue, we must first identify those 
firms or industries most affected by unions and, second, locate the sources 
of union rents. To the extent that unions reduce profits below competitive 
levels, the long-run survival of union firms is threatened. For this reason, 
the most likely sources of union rents are economic profits deriving from 
market power and quasi rents associated with special firm advantages or 
long-lived physical and intangible capital investments. Note that monopoly 
profits need not be fully appropriable where firms can transfer, at low 
cost, production to a nonunion environment. On the other hand, appro- 
priable quasi rents need not be associated with monopoly power or supra- 
competitive returns; rather, they may simply represent normal returns to 
long-lived investments (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). 
Much attention has focused on the relationship between unions, profits, 
and market structure. Clark (1984) finds for the PIMS sample that the 
large reduction in profitability associated with unionization is entirely re- 
stricted to businesses with low market shares despite much higher profit 
rates in firms with high market shares. Clark rationalizes this surprising 
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result by postulating a transmission mechanism by which roughly equal 
union wage increases are generated throughout an industry, with large 
percentage profit effects on low market share, low-margin firms and neg- 
ligible effects on high market share, high-margin firms. This result is not 
corroborated elsewhere (e.g., Hirsch and Connolly 1987) and would seem 
to be specific to the PIMS sample of businesses. 
In what appears to be the leitmotiv of this literature, Freeman (1983), 
Karier (1985), and Salinger (1984) conclude that negative union profit 
effects are restricted to highly concentrated industries (but see Domowitz, 
Hubbard, and Petersen 1986; Voos and Mishel 1986b). Freeman and Karier 
base their conclusions on industry PCM equations in which an industry 
unionization variable interacts negatively with concentration (or concen- 
tration dummies). Both authors report large and significant profit reduc- 
tions in highly concentrated industries and an absence of profit reduction 
in lowly concentrated industries. Salinger's evidence is less straightforward. 
He estimates a nonlinear least squares profit equation (with q as the profits 
measure) in which industry unionism enters in a three-way interaction 
with concentration and a vector of profit determinants. His union coef- 
ficient can be treated as the "tax rate" on the returns produced jointly by 
concentration and the profit determinants. He, too, concludes that unions 
capture most of the monopoly profits associated with concentration. 
The above studies appear to show that union labor captures a significant 
share of potential monopoly profits, while having little effect in relatively 
more competitive industries. They also establish that the omission of union 
variables in traditional profit models is a serious flaw. Despite the appeal 
of these findings, the conclusion that industry concentration provides the 
major source for union rents would appear to be incorrect (for a detailed 
critique, see Hirsch and Connolly [1987]). For example, it is far from 
settled whether concentration does in fact produce any excess profits from 
which unions can extract rents. Few firm-level analyses find concentration 
to be a significant determinant of profits, and many find a negative relation 
between the variables (Bothwell, Cooley, and Hall 1984).9 Indeed, Ra- 
venscraft (1983) and others have shown that the positive coefficient on 
concentration i  industry-level profit studies may instead capture the effect 
of firm-level market share. Using firm or line-of-business-level data, market 
share is an important positive determinant of profits, whereas concentration 
is, if anything, negatively related to profits. 
Moreover, if concentration is the major source for union gains, there 
should exist corroborative vidence from the labor market indicating a 
9 Salinger finds little vidence that concentration generates profits for unions to 
capture yet interprets his results in a manner similar to Freeman (1983) and Karier 
(1985). Hirsch and Connolly (1987) reexamine Salinger's nonlinear least squares 
results using a similar data base. They show that Salinger's functional form is 
unduly restrictive and that there is little support for the contention that concen- 
tration-related profits provide a source for union rents. 
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larger union-nonunion compensation differential in more concentrated 
industries (Hirsch and Connolly 1987). Yet earnings function studies gen- 
erally find little vidence that concentration increases either union or non- 
union wages, and there xists no significant microlevel vidence of larger 
union premiums in more concentrated industries (Lewis 1986, pp. 154- 
55). If anything, union premiums appear somewhat smaller in more con- 
centrated industries (e.g., Mellow 1983). And firm-level evidence on To- 
bin's q and r, (Hirsch and Connolly 1987) suggests hat he results obtained 
in earlier studies may have been sensitive to specification a d omitted 
variables. 10 
Recently, attention has shifted away from a focus on market structure 
as a source of union gains toward quasi rents on firm investments. In
Baldwin's (1983) theoretical model, it is argued that when the capital cycle 
is long relative to the union's time horizon, the surplus that provides the 
return on durable and specialized capital is vulnerable to capture by or- 
ganized labor. Once such capital is in place, the firm will share quasi rents 
with the union rather than allow a strike to shut the firm down. Baldwin 
contends that, in response, a union firm is likely to keep in place inefficient 
capital as a means of moderating union wage demands. Subsequent papers 
have emphasized that union behavior is unlikely to be compatible with 
efficiency; that is, the joint wealth of shareholders plus current and potential 
future union members will not be maximized as long as union membership 
is nontransferable. 
Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) extend Baldwin's rent-seeking 
model to the case of intangible capital, treating unions as a tax on the 
returns from nontransferable research and development (R&D) capital. 
Consistent with that model, R&D investments ark found to add less to 
the market value of firms in highly unionized industries than to the value 
of firms in lowly unionized industries. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) 
develop a model in which firms in a declining industry with high fixed 
costs from long-lived capital will face increased union bargaining power. 
Their argument isthat union bargaining power may be enhanced in the 
short run by a secular decline in demand. Such a decline may decrease the 
elasticity of labor demand ue to a decrease in the elasticity of substitution 
stemming from the inability to substitute lumpy labor-saving capital for 
union labor. The model is applied specifically to the steel industry toexplain 
why an increased union wage premium accompanied falling steel output 
'? Hirsch and Connolly (1987) conclude that returns to market share, R&D, and 
limited foreign competition may be more likely sources of union rents than is 
concentration. Their market share results conflict with Clark's (1984) rather coun- 
terintuitive findings. Note that a likely source for union gains are rents made possible 
by government protection and regulation; for example, in industries uch as postal 
delivery and, prior to deregulation, airlines and trucking. 
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during the seventies, followed by rapid employment declines during the 
eighties (see, relatedly, Linneman and Wachter [1986]). 
A prediction of the union rent-seeking models is that the union tax on 
a firm's quasi rents will affect investment behavior and, subsequently, that 
firm's long-run economic performance. We return to these themes in the 
next section. But note that evidence supporting strong efficiency or value 
maximization, given levels of quasi rents (Abowd 1987), does not imply 
long-run allocative efficiency if union bargaining power affects firm in- 
vestment behavior. 
Finally, it would be particularly illuminating to effect a comparison of 
survival rates between union and nonunion firms. Unfortunately, virtually 
no information is available to us in this area. An exception is the limited 
analysis by Kaufman and Kaufman (1987) of the automotive engine and 
body parts industry, concluding that firms organized by the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) are significantly more likely to have failed than nonunion 
and non-UAW union firms. This finding is consistent with estimates de- 
rived from their sample of surviving firms of a large UAW compensation 
(but not productivity) premium relative to non-UAW and nonunion firms. 
The above evidence points unambiguously to lower profitability under 
unionism. Despite a variety of statistical problems that tend to bias esti- 
mated profit effects toward zero, unions' true impact is likely to reside 
within the range of estimates presented in table 1. The productivity profits 
puzzle stated at the outset of this section-that evidence of large union 
productivity effects is incompatible with evidence of large profit reduc- 
tions-may be more apparent than real. Our reading of the evidence is 
that reductions in profitability seem likely to result from a combination 
of union wage increases and rather small (and possibly negative) union 
effects on productivity. (Note again the variability in each effect across 
firms, industries, and time.) Although it is not in doubt that unions reduce 
profitability over long periods of time, competitive pressures in labor, 
product, and capital markets must ultimately limit the profit spread between 
union and nonunion firms or lead to reductions in the size of the union 
sector. The steep decline in private sector unionism may have resulted in 
no small part from the relatively poor profit performance of U.S. companies 
during the 1970s. The magnitude of union-nonunion differences in eco- 
nomic performance during the 1980s awaits detailed empirical scrutiny. 
IV. Unions, Investment Behavior, and Productivity Growth 
The traditional on-the-demand-curve model treats a union wage increase 
as an exogenous increase in the price of labor and a relative decrease in 
the price of capital. Profit-maximizing firms respond by freely varying 
their input mix, increasing the relative use of capital and higher-quality 
labor. Investment activity may increase or decrease, depending on the rel- 
ative strength of scale and substitution effects. By contrast, the union rent- 
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seeking model views union wage increases as an outcome made possible 
by a tax on the firm's returns or quasi rents accruing from market power 
and long-lived investments. A firm facing a powerful union is less likely 
to put in place new long-lived capital (even of a labor-saving type), because 
a union with a credible strike threat can appropriate a share of the normal 
returns from that investment. In the face of effective rent seeking, firms 
reduce investments in tangible and intangible capital whose returns are 
most vulnerable to union capture." 
Empirical evidence with direct bearing on the union rent-seeking hy- 
pothesis remains meager. Baldwin (1983) contends that her theoretical 
model applies particularly well to the steel industry (see, also, Lawrence 
and Lawrence 1985). Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) hypothesize 
that firms in highly unionized industries will invest less in R&D because 
such investments add less to the market value of union than nonunion 
firms. Based on evidence from a 1976 sample of 367 Fortune 500 firms, 
they find that firms in highly unionized industries have significantly ower 
R&D intensity (R&D investment divided by sales). Union and union- 
profitability interaction variables enter negatively in their R&D intensity 
equation, suggesting that unions decrease R&D investment both directly 
and also through a redirection of earnings away from vulnerable R&D. 
Two recent studies also conclude that innovative activity is less pro- 
nounced in unionized firms. Acs and Audretsch (1987) use 1982 manu- 
facturing data and find significantly fewer large- and small-firm innovations 
in highly unionized industries.12 Hirsch and Link (1987) provide similar 
evidence from a survey of 315 small- and medium-sized New York state 
manufacturing businesses in 1985. Their ordered probit models, in which 
Likert-scale responses to survey questions on the importance of product 
" In addition to the papers by Baldwin (1983), Lawrence and Lawrence (1985), 
and Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986), see Grout (1984) and Tauman and 
Weiss (1987). Using a Nash bargaining model, Grout shows that firms facing a 
union will have lower levels of investment when contracts are nonbinding than 
when they are binding. Tauman and Weiss develop a duopoly model in which 
either the union or nonunion firm may choose the most productive technology, 
depending on the set of assumptions chosen. In the case where the union chooses 
a wage after firms elect their technologies, the union firm is unlikely to adopt the 
most productive technology. Note that even if cooperative (i.e., jointly maximizing) 
settlements obtain, investment will be below the competitive level if the union's 
time horizon is shorter than the expected life of capital. For a fuller discussion, see 
Hirsch (in press). 
12 The number of innovations are calculated separately for large and small firms 
within industries. The data were provided by the Small Business Administration, 
which defines an innovation as "a process that begins with an invention, proceeds 
with the development of the invention, and results in introduction of a new product, 
process or service to the marketplace" (Acs and Audretsch 1987, p. 110, n. 1). 
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innovation (relative to their competitors) are the dependent variables, in- 
dicate that innovative activity is significantly ess important for union than 
for nonunion businesses. 
Recent work by Bronars and Deere (1986) and Hirsch (in press) offer 
more comprehensive analyses of union effects on firm investment and 
financial behavior. Bronars and Deere develop a dynamic model in which 
joint wealth maximization by shareholders and current union members 
does not maximize rents accruing to shareholders and all current and future 
union members. Because current union members cannot be compensated 
by future union members (e.g., through the purchase of union member- 
ship), both they and shareholders have an incentive to shift positive cash 
flows closer to the present and defer negative cash flows further into the 
future. Hence, Bronars and Deere predict that unionized firms will have 
lower tangible and intangible capital investments, offer a higher payout 
rate to shareholders, and rely more heavily on debt financing. Empirical 
results from an unbalanced panel of 756 publicly traded firms on the Com- 
pustat tapes between 1972 and 1976, matched to industry union coverage 
data, provide support for these hypotheses."3 Other things equal, they find 
that firms in more unionized industries have (1) lower investments in capital 
and lower capital-to-labor atios, (2) lower R&D investments, (3) lower 
advertising expenditures, (4) higher debt and debt-equity ratios, and (5) 
higher payouts (dividends and stock repurchases) and a higher ratio of 
payouts to retained earnings. All union results are highly significant, he 
magnitude of the union coefficients in the R&D and debt-equity equations 
being particularly large. 
Hirsch (in press) provides a similar analysis for data on 315 Fortune 
1,000 firms during the 1970s. This study employs a firm-level measure of 
union coverage (based on a 1972 survey) and includes detailed industry 
controls in the regression equations. Hirsch finds that unionized firms 
invest significantly less in research and development and physical capital 
than do similar nonunion firms. And in a recent study using the Ruback 
and Zimmerman (1984) election data, Bronars and Deere (1987) find that 
firms decrease capital investment and employment, while increasing debt, 
following union representation elections (regardless of the outcome) but 
find no conclusive evidence that R&D or advertising expenditures are af- 
fected. 
Lower profitability and decreased tangible and intangible capital in- 
vestments among union firms are likely to have a negative impact on the 
long-run productivity growth of firms. This brings us to what at first 
appears to be a puzzle in the literature: the sharply differentiated results 
13 Bronars and Deere (1986) do not include industry dummies or detailed industry 
control variables in their regressions. 
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of production function studies indicating positive union productivity effects 
on the one hand, and the R&D-based productivity growth literature on 
the other. Most R&D studies that include a union argument report total 
factor productivity growth to be negatively associated (but not always 
significantly so) with the level of unionism (e.g., Terleckyj 1974; Kendrick 
and Grossman 1980; Mansfield 1980; Link 1981; and Sveikauskas and Svei- 
kauskas 1982; but for an exception, see Clark and Griliches [1984])."4 
But there need be no inconsistency between the two sets of findings. 
From equation (3), a positive coefficient on the union variable in the pro- 
duction function test implies that unionized establishments have higher 
total factor productivity. Accordingly, an attempted reconciliation of the 
productivity and productivity growth literatures might proceed as follows: 
unions increase the level of productivity (perhaps through shock effects) 
but subsequently retard productivity growth, possibly reflecting long-run 
responses to decreased profit expectations. An alternative but more con- 
ventional argument would be that the legacy or heritage effects of union 
work rules are negative. This is the argument espoused by Maki (1983), 
in an analysis of the growth of total factor productivity in Canadian man- 
ufacturing during the period 1926-78. Ignoring the error term, Maki es- 
timates the equation 
p = ao + aP + a2AP + a3S, (11) 
where p is the annual growth rate of total factor productivity, P is union 
density, and S is days lost through strikes divided by total employment 
(we ignore control variables). The first union term is supposed to pick up 
the long-term effects of unionism on growth, while first differences in P 
are intended to proxy impact or shock effects. Maki finds that the shock 
effects are positive and the long-term effects are negative. For the various 
specifications, ittakes from 5 to 8 years (coefficient a2 divided by a,) for 
the one-time positive effect of an increase in unionization to be offset by 
the continuing long-term effect of unionism in slowing growth. 
In a related analysis of U.S. productivity growth in two-digit manufac- 
turing industries from 1957 to 1973, Hirsch and Link (1984) show that if 
one specifies the standard Cobb-Douglas model in difference form, then 
changes in total factor productivity, p should be a function of changes in 
union density, AP (see eq. 3). Since Hirsch and Link employ a three- 
14 Hirsch (in press) finds productivity growth during the 1970s to be slower for 
companies with high levels of firm union coverage in 1972, although much of the 
slower growth can be accounted for by controlling indetail for industry effects. 
The union coefficient in a productivity growth equation measures only the direct 
union effect, however; unions affect growth indirectly through their impact on 
investments in capital and R&D. 
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factor Cobb-Douglas function to include technical capital, their estimating 
equation (ignoring control variables) is 
p = X + 'D(dT/dt)/Q + (1 - a)(c - 1)AP, (12) 
where X is the rate of disembodied growth, ID is aQ/OT (the marginal 
product of technical capital), dT/dt approximates net investments into 
stock T, and (dT/dt)/Q is proxied by R&D intensity. They report a 
negative rather than a positive coefficient on the union change variable, 
contrary to the prediction of the collective voice model. When Hirsch and 
Link also include a level of unionism variable, both P and AP are negatively 
and significantly related to productivity growth. The inference is, then, 
that unionism not only reduces total factor productivity (as reflected in 
the sign on AP) but also slows the rate of productivity increase." 
Finally, note that studies estimating union effects on productivity growth 
attempt o hold constant changes in stocks of R&D and physical capital. 
The specific routes through which unions slow productivity growth have 
not been examined thoroughly. To the extent that unions decrease in- 
vestment in tangible and intangible capital, these studies understate the 
negative impact of unionism on firm and industry growth. A full accounting 
of the union role requires measurement not only of unions' direct effects 
on productivity growth, but also of any indirect effects deriving from their 
impact on investment decisions (Allen 1986c; Hirsch, in press).16 
The rather divergent conclusions reached in the production function 
and R&D literatures cast further doubt on the hypothesis that unions raise 
productivity. Ifunionized firms and industries are significantly more pro- 
ductive, ceteris paribus, should not there be evidence of faster productivity 
growth in industries and firms where unionization has grown most or 
declined least? Evidence of lower investment, reduced innovative activity, 
and slower productivity growth in more unionized sectors hould not only 
engender caution in evaluating the evidence from production function 
studies, but also should give rise to concern about the long-run impact of 
unions on economic performance. Perhaps the long run has arrived. 
15 We are reluctant to place undue emphasis on the Hirsch and Link findings 
because of the level of aggregation, the limited number of observations, the possible 
endogeneity ofunionism, and the fragility ofthe conventional production function 
test. In an analysis of productivity growth in construction, however, Allen (1986c) 
also finds productivity change inversely related to both the initial level and change 
in unionization. Freeman and Medoff (1984, pp. 169-71) contend that the rela- 
tionship between productivity growth and unionism istoo weak to draw any definite 
conclusions. 
16 It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about unionism's economy-wide impact, 
since decreased investment and growth among union firms frees resources for non- 
union firms. Such resource movement is neither instantaneous nor costless, however; 
if it were, there would not exist. such significant profit differences between union 
and nonunion companies. 
100 Addison/Hirsch 
V. Conclusions 
Our analysis of the burgeoning literature investigating union effects on 
productivity, profits, and growth as exposed a number of unresolved 
issues. Statistical shortcomings and considerable ambiguity attach to the 
production function tests adopted in the bulk of the productivity studies. 
While mpirical evidence is mixed, the contention that unions, on average, 
significantly raise productivity cannot be sustained. Several empirical reg- 
ularities in this literature, however, may be exploited. First, positive union 
productivity effects end to be most pronounced in industries where union- 
nonunion wage differentials relarge. Second, positive ffects are more 
evident where competitive pressures are present. And, relatedly, positive 
effects are absent or quite small in the public and less competitive s ctors- 
with or without a union wage premium. Although the link between these 
observed regularities is somewhat shaky, since unions are least likely to 
obtain large wage premiums in more competitive s ttings, the findings are 
broadly consistent with both shock effect and selectivity explanations. 
Firms in competitive environments are "shocked" into productivity im- 
provements inthe face of wage increases and decreased profit expectations. 
And competitive pressures ensure that in the very long run, firms must 
increase productivity in order to survive. Thus, any cross-section sample 
of firms will be nonrepresentative, since unionized firms not increasing 
their productivity are least likely to survive. 
The finding that unions reduce profitability further calls into question 
the sizable union productivity differentials reported in some of the pro- 
duction function studies. Freeman and Medoff argue that unions reduce 
profitability n general because their productivity effects, though substan- 
tive, are nevertheless in ufficient to offset increases in wage costs and greater 
capital intensity. To this is added the rider that since union profit effects 
are largely restricted to highly concentrated industries the longer-term 
consequences of this transfer a e benign. Our own reading of this literature 
is that many of the productivity and profit results are simply inconsistent; 
"true" productivity effects are more likely to be close to zero and negative 
profit effects may be less severe than suggested in the empirical literature. 
The conclusion that unions capture concentration-related profits i based 
largely on a fragile conometric relationship between profitability, con- 
centration, and unionism at the industry level. Corroborative evidence 
from the labor market is lacking. Returns accruing from other correlates 
of market power (e.g., market share, foreign competition, and government 
entry restrictions) and from long-lived capital appear to be more important 
sources of union rents. 
The manner in which union rent seeking proceeds is of some importance. 
Such evidence as we have been able to uncover does not encourage an 
optimistic view of unionism's longer-term consequences. Union rent seek- 
ing at the expense of long-lived tangible and intangible capital appears to 
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lower firms' investment in physical capital, as well as to decrease R&D 
and other innovative and risk-taking activities. As a consequence, pro- 
ductivity growth tends to be slower in unionized firms and industries. 
Increased management opposition to unions, and declining union coverage 
and employment within most sectors of the U.S. economy, appear to be 
predictable responses to the relatively poor performance of highly union- 
ized companies during the 1970s. More work is required here, particularly 
in the construction of improved data sets. But already the locus of the 
debate has shifted toward a consideration of unionism's dynamic effects 
on long-run economic performance. 
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